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DETERMINING THE BENEFICIARIES FOR WRONGFUL
DEATH ACTIONS UNDER GENERAL
MARITIME LAW
Until 1886 federal courts recognized a cause of action for wrongful
death under general maritime law.' In that year, however, the United
States Supreme Court held in The Harrisburg that the general maritime
law did not provide for recovery of damages for wrongful deaths upon
navigable waters. 2 The Court thus made statutory authorization a pre-
requisite to maritime wrongful death benefits. 3
Two developments ensued from The Harrisburg. First, the Supreme
Court afforded relief to decedents' survivors by extending the coverage
of state wrongful death acts to admiralty cases. In 1907 the Court held
that maritime law would recognize a cause of action for wrongful death
occurring outside the territorial waters of a state when that state's
wrongful death statute would have granted recovery had the death oc-
curred on land.4 The Court later expanded this principle, applying it to
1. See, e.g., The Sea Gull, 21 F. Cas. 909 (C.C.D. Md. 1865) (No. 12,578). Article III,
section 2, of the United States Constitution gives federal courts subject-matter jurisdiction over
maritime, or admiralty, cases. Although Congress legislates on admiralty matters from time to
time, "[n]o area of federal law is judge-made at its source to such an extent as is the law of
admiralty." Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 550 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
In the United States, no separate courts are responsible for maritime issues. Nevertheless, mari-
time law is a separate body of law, with its own principles stemming from both English precedent
and the law of nations. For a more detailed discussion of the history, background, and institu-
tional setting of admiralty law, see G. GILMORE & C. BLACy, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 1-18 (2d
ed. 1975).
2. The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886). The Supreme Court, noting that the common law
did not provide a cause of action for wrongful death, believed that the maritime law should follow
suit. Id at 213-14.
The failure of English common law to afford a remedy for wrongful death probably grew out of
the felony-merger doctrine, pursuant to which the possible civil suit for wrongful death merged
into the criminal action. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 382 (1970). Although
American jurisdictions almost unanimously adopted the common law rule precluding civil wrong-
ful death remedies, they declined to accept the underlying felony-merger doctrine on which that
rule rested. Id at 384-86. The English Parliament passed the first wrongful death statute, Lord
Campbell's Act, in 1846, creating a cause of action for the benefit of the decedent's survivors. Id
at 389. Every American jurisdiction has followed the English example and enacted its own
wrongful death act. Id at 390. A number of federal wrongful death statutes afford similar relief
in areas of federal concern. Id. For a more detailed history of wrongful death remedies in Anglo-
American law, see S. SPsEISR, REcovERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH 2-60 (2d ed. 1975).
3. The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199, 213-14 (1886).
4. The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398, 407 (1907).
Washington University Open Scholarship
504 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 62:503
cases in which the wrongful death occurred on navigable waters within
a state's territory.5
Second, in 1920, Congress enacted two wrongful death statutes to
assist survivors of persons killed on navigable waters. In the Jones
Act,6 Congress applied the Federal Employers' Liability Act7 to actions
for wrongful death suffered by seamen in the course of their employ-
ment. The Jones Act provided relief whether death occurred within or
without a state's territorial waters.8 Congress also passed the Death on
the High Seas Act (DOHSA), 9 which allowed survivors to recover for
deaths occurring outside the territorial waters of a state if the deaths
resulted from neglect, default, or wrongful act. 10 Attempts to extend
DOHSA's applicability to deaths occurring within state territorial wa-
ters have failed."
From 1920 to 1970, survivors of non-seamen who died on navigable
waters within the territory of a state had to rely upon the chance appli-
cability of a state statute when suing for wrongful death in admiralty.12
In addition, admiralty courts had to adopt all substantive elements of a
state's wrongful death statute.' 3
The interaction of various court decisions and state and federal stat-
utes created several anomalies that restricted beneficiaries' right to re-
5. Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233, 242 (1921).
6. Jones Act, ch. 250, § 33, 41 Stat. 1007 (1920) (currently codified at 46 U.S.C. § 688
(1982)).
7. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1982).
8. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1982).
9. Death on the High Seas Act, ch. 11, § 1, 41 Stat. 537 (1920) (currently codified at 46
U.S.C. §§ 761-767 (1982)).
10. DOHSA permits recovery "whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful
act, neglect, or default occurring on the high seas beyond a marine league from the shore of any
State, or the District of Columbia, or the Territories or dependencies of the United States." 46
U.S.C. § 761 (1982). DOHSA's final section reinforces this territorial limitation, stating: "Nor
shall this Act apply to the Great Lakes or to any waters within the territorial limits of any
State .... " 46 U.S.C. § 767 (1982).
11. During debate on the Act in 1920, Congress considered but rejected applying DOHSA to
deaths occurring within state territorial waters. See Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573,
588 n.22 (1974); Greene v. Vantage S.S. Corp., 466 F.2d 159, 167 n.13 (4th Cir. 1972). Subsequent
attempts to extend DOHSA's applicability also proved unsuccessful. See also Moragne v. States
Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 405 n.17 (1970) (legislative changes referred to in note do not appear
in current version of code).
12. Survivors of seamen killed in the course of employment could, however, seek relief under
the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688, which, unlike DOHSA, does not have geographical restrictions.
See supra notes 6 & 8 and accompanying text.
13. The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588, 592 (1959).
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cover for wrongful death. First, the general maritime law imposed
liability on the owner of a vessel when the vessel's unseaworthiness
caused personal injury.14 Because the majority of states did not recog-
nize a breach of the seaworthiness duty as a ground for liability, how-
ever, survivors could not recover when a vessel's unseaworthiness
caused a death rather than a nonfatal injury.t5 Second, survivors could
assert a claim under DOHSA when an owner's breach of the duty to
provide a seaworthy vessel caused death outside the territorial waters
of a state.16 In contrast, an admiralty court would deny recovery if the
same breach occurred within a state's waters and the state wrongful
death act did not encompass claims based on unseaworthiness. Third,
because a Jones Act claim arising out of a seaman's death within a
state's territorial waters preempts the state's wrongful death act and re-
quires a finding of negligence, survivors of a seaman could not recover
for death due to unseaworthiness.17 Survivors of a nonseaman would,
however, recover under the state wrongful death act if the particular
state statute recognized claims based on unseaworthiness.18
In 1970, the Supreme Court sought to resolve these incongruities and
to reconcile the general maritime law with the policy that a claim
should lie for wrongful death. In Moragne v. States Marine Lines, the
Court declared a right of action for wrongful death under general mari-
14. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 395 (1970); Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki,
328 U.S. 85, 94-95 (1946).
15. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 395 (1970). Although the Court in The
Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959), reached unanimity with respect to most aspects of its
opinion, four justices entered a strong dissent on the question of how to apply state law. The
dissenting justices argued that admiralty courts should read the maritime standards of unseawor-
thiness into state wrongful death acts. Id. at 597-612 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See infra notes 24-
32 and accompanying text (discussing MAoragne).
16. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 395 (1970). Courts have interpreted
DOHSA to encompass claims based upon a shipowner's breach of duty to provide a seaworthy
vessel. Chermesino v. Vessel Judith Lee Rose, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 36 (D. Mass. 1962). The duty to
provide a seaworthy vessel "is essentially a species of liability without fault. . . a form of absolute
duty owing to all within the range of its humanitarian policy." Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328
U.S. 85, 94-95 (1946). Seaworthiness requires that the hull and gear of a ship be fit for the voyage
in question, and that the operating personnel be capable of handling the ship. For a discussion of
these and other aspects of the duty of seaworthiness, see GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note I, at
390-404. The cause of action for wrongful death under the general maritime law also allows a
claim for death caused by unseaworthiness. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 376-
78, 409 (1970). The availability of unseaworthiness as a basis for liability does not prevent recov-
ery for injury due to negligence in maritime cases unless there is a statutory bar. Id. at 376-78.
17. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 395 (1970).
18. Id at 396.
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time law. 9 The Court refused, however, to go beyond creating a right
of action, leaving the lower courts to determine the elements of the new
cause, including the schedule of beneficiaries. 21
In the fourteen years since Moragne, the lower courts have failed to
produce a uniform schedule of beneficiaries. The first section of this
Note examines the Moragne decision's suggestions regarding the sched-
ule of beneficiaries for maritime wrongful deaths and the difficulties
that lower courts have experienced in attempting to follow those sug-
gestions.2 1 The second and third sections of this Note analyze the poli-
cies of uniformity and liberality that underlay Moragne and its
progeny.22 The final section of this Note suggests a method for con-
structing a beneficiary schedule consistent with the policies of uniform-
ity and liberality. 3
I. THE MOJ,4GNE DECISION AND ITS AFTERMATH
In Moragne v. States Marine Lines,24 the Supreme Court held that
the general maritime law provided a cause of action for death resulting
from a breach of maritime duties including unseaworthiness. 25 The
Moragne Court indicated that two policy considerations supported its
decision to recognize a maritime wrongful death cause of action. First,
replacement of the patchwork of case law and statutes in wrongful
death would promote uniformity in admiralty law.26 Second, the ex-
isting system of rules, which predicated recovery upon an accident of
geography,27 frustrated the maritime law policy of lberality-admi-
ralty's "special solicitude" for those who work or travel on navigable
waters.2 8 The creation of a uniform cause of action ensured that mari-
19. Id at 378 & 402-03.
20. Id at 408.
21. See infra notes 24-50 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 51-81 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 82-103 and accompanying text.
24. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
25. Id at 409. In Aoragne, a longshoreman died while working on board a ship within the
territorial waters of Florida. His widow sued the owner of the vessel to recover for wrongful death
caused by negligence and unseaworthiness. Because the Florida wrongful death act did not recog-
nize unseaworthiness as a basis of liability, the lower courts dismissed that portion of the com-
plaint. Id at 376-78. For a review of the distinction between unseaworthiness and negligence as
bases for liability, see supra note 16.
26. 398 U.S. at 400-02.
27. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.




time law would afford recovery for a wrongful death regardless of the
locus of the accident. In Moragne, then, the uniformity of the remedy
simultaneously simplified the law and achieved liberality in recovery.
The Moragne Court, declining to establish the details of the new
wrongful death action, instructed the lower courts to rely upon preex-
isting personal injury law.29 Unlike an action for wrongful death, how-
ever, personal injury law does not provide a schedule of beneficiaries
entitled to recover.30 Although parties to the case urged the Court to
adopt the schedule of beneficiaries from DOHSA, the Court refused,
noting only that lower courts would not lack guidance.31 The Court
contended that the federal and state wrongful death statutes would pro-
vide "persuasive analogy" to guide the lower courts and to supplement
the Moragne decision.32
The Supreme Court thus provided guidance on two levels to lower
courts attempting to decide who should benefit under a Moragne cause
of action. First, the Court directed the lower courts to look to various
wrongful death statutes for model schedules of beneficiaries. Second,
lower courts could fashion specific schedules in light of the underlying
policies of uniformity and liberality.
After Moragne, lower courts could pursue one of four strategies for
shaping beneficiary schedules. First, an admiralty court could create a
beneficiary schedule ex nihilo pursuant to its constitutional power to
29. Id at 405-06.
30. Id. at 406.
31. Id at 406-08. Both the petitioner and the United States, as amicus curiae, argued for
adoption of the DOHSA schedule of beneficiaries. Id at 408. They maintained that because the
obligations of admiralty are primarily a federal concern, the search for a schedule of beneficiaries
should focus first on congressional expressions on the subject. Three federal laws are pertinent to
the inquiry: the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA), 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-767; the Jones Act, 46
U.S.C. § 688 (which incorporates by reference the schedule of beneficiaries from the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. § 51); and the Longshoreman's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. § 909. See 398 U.S. at 406-07. The United States
pointed out that of the three statutes, only DOHSA explicitly applies to any person. Id at 407-08.
In contrast, the remaining two statutes are more restrictive, the Jones Act applying only to seamen
killed in the course of their employment and the LHWCA applying only to longshoremen and
allied workers. Of the three, moreover, only DOHSA awards relief based on a violation of the
standards of care established by maritime law. Id at 407-08. The Jones Act predicates recovery
upon violation of a standard of negligence derived from FELA, and the LHWCA employs work-
men's compensation principles to provide standardized amounts of compensation regardless of
fault. Id. at 407. The United States argued, therefore, that the adoption of the DOHSA benefici-
ary schedule would apply a congressional standard of recovery to the new maritime law cause of
action for wrongful death and promote uniformity in its application. Id at 406-08.
32. Id. at 408.
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determine maritime law.33 Despite this ability, no court has created a
beneficiary schedule without any reference to existing wrongful death
statutes.34 Second, a court could use a particular state statute's benefi-
ciary schedule. 35 Third, a court could adopt a beneficiary schedule re-
flecting the approach of a majority of state wrongful death statutes. 6
Finally, a court could employ one of the federal statutory wrongful
death beneficiary schedules.3 7
The beneficiary schedules of the two primary federal wrongful death
statutes, DOHSA and the Jones Act, comprise two categories of benefi-
ciaries.38 First, a group of certain relatives (surviving spouses, children
and parents) may recover regardless of dependancy.39  Second, the
33. See supra note 1 (discussing the constitutional basis of the judiciary's power to declare
maritime law). The Supreme Court has not permitted this grant of power to lie dormant. See
Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 20-21 (1963) ("IT]he Congress has largely left
to this Court the responsibility for fashioning the controlling rules of admiralty law. This Court
has long recognized its power and responsibility in this area and has exercised that power where
necessary to do so."); Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 550 (1960) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) ("No area of federal law is judge-made at its source to such an extent as is the law of
admiralty."); Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 314 (1955) ("[l]n the
absence of controlling Acts of Congress this Court has fashioned a large part of the existing rules
that govern admiralty.").
34. One court expressly declined to fashion a distinct schedule of beneficiaries. Ford v.
American Original Corp., 475 F. Supp. 10, 14 (E.D. Va. 1979) (woman living with decedent can-
not recover under Moragne). Other courts have implied that they will not simply create a benefici-
ary schedule, thus denying recovery to complainants who fall outside the scope of any existing
beneficiary schedule. See, e.g., In re Cambria S.S. Co., 505 F.2d 517 (6th Cir. 1974), cerl. denied,
420 U.S. 975 (1975) (nondependent brother is not a beneficiary for a Moragne action); Hamilton v.
Canal Barge Co., 395 F. Supp. 978 (E.D. La. 1975) (fiancee lies outside any schedule of benefi-
ciaries for purposes of a Moragne action). In most cases, the courts' refusal to construct their own
beneficiary schedules manifests itself in a finding that a complainant is within the scope of benefi-
ciaries in a Moragne action based on existing schedules. See, e.g., Skidmore v. Grueninger, 506
F.2d 716 (5th Cir. 1975); Palmer v. Ribax, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 974 (M.D. Fla. 1976); Hebert v. Otto
Candies, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 503 (E.D. La. 1975); Green v. Ross, 338 F. Supp. 365 (S.D. Fla, 1972),
af'd, 481 F.2d 102 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 414 U.S. 1068 (1973).
35. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 408 (1970).
36. Id (suggesting a consideration of any schedule approved by a majority of states).
37. See supra note 31.
38. DOHSA allows recovery "for the exclusive benefit of the decedent's wife, husband, par-
ent, child or dependent relative." 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1982). The Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688, incor-
porates the following schedules from the Federal Employers' Liability Act: "[Tihe surviving
widow or husband and children of such employees; and, if none, then.., such employee's par-
ents; and, if none, then.., the next of kin dependent upon such employee." 45 U.S.C. § 51
(1982).
39. DOHSA permits recovery for the following nondependent relatives: "decedent's spouse,
parent, or child." 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1982). The Jones Act permits recovery by the same three types
of nondependent beneficiary. 45 U.S.C. § 688 (1982).
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schedules include a residual category made up of any other relatives
who were dependant on the decedent.4 The two statutes vary, how-
ever, in the application of their schedules. The Jones Act schedule op-
erates according to a hierarchy in which recovery by a beneficiary in a
particular category excludes recovery by all beneficiaries lower in the
hierarchy.4' DOHSA, in contrast, allows recovery by all persons
within the ambit of the statutory schedule.42
Courts consistently hold a claimant to be a Moragne cause of action
beneficiary if that claimant comes within the beneficiary schedule pro-
vided by one of the applicable federal wrongful death acts.4 3 Even
courts that look both to federal and state statutes grant recovery if a
beneficiary comes within the ambit of a federal statute.' The federal
wrongful death statutes' beneficiary schedules thus appear to operate as
a minimum schedule, inclusion in which guarantees a right to recover
under Moragne.45
When a claimant does not fit into one of the beneficiary schedules of
the federal wrongful death statutes, a court is confronted with the ques-
tion whether to adhere to the narrower beneficiary schedules from the
federal statutes and deny recovery or to consider the broader46 sched-
40. DOHSA allows "dependent relatives" to recover. 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1982). The Jones Act
allows dependent "next of kin" to recover. 45 U.S.C. § 688 (1982).
41. A widow's recovery, for example, will cut off any possible recovery by surviving children,
parents, or other dependent next of kin. Comment, Monetary Recovery Under Federal Transporta-
tion Statutes, 45 TEx. L. REv. 984, 986-88 (1967).
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., Mungin v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 342 F. Supp. 479, 480 (D. Md. 1972) (those per-
sons entitled to recover under DOHSA or the Jones Act are entitled to recover under a Moragne
cause of action); see also Ford v. American Original Corp., 475 F. Supp. 10, 13 (E.D. Va. 1979)
(citing Mungin with approval).
44. Spiller v. Thomas M. Lowe, Jr. & Assocs., Inc., 466 F.2d 903 (8th Cir. 1972) (both
DOHSA and Arkansas statutes make parents and step-children beneficiaries).
45. A majority of courts prefer DOHSA over other federal statutes, see, e.g., Spiller v.
Thomas M. Lowe, Jr. & Assocs., Inc., 466 F.2d 908 (8th Cir. 1972), although one court has used
the LHWCA. In re Industrial Transp. Corp., 344 F. Supp. 1311 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
46. The additional classes of beneficiaries usually arise when state statutes omit dependency
requirements. Compare KY. REv. STAT. § 411. 130 (1963) ("If the deceased leaves no widow, hus-
band or child, and if both father and mother are dead, then the whole of the recovery shall be-
come a part of the personal estate of the deceased and . . . shall pass to his kindred more
remote. ... ."); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2922 (1980) ("Such person or persons entitled to such
damages shall be of that class who, by law, would be entitled to inherit the personal property of
the deceased had he died intestate."); VA. CODE § 8.01-53 (1979) ("The damages.. . shall be
distributed.., to (i) the surviving spouse, children of the deceased and children of any deceased
child of the deceased, or (ii) if there be none such, then to the parents, brothers and sisters of the
deceased. . . .") with 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1982) (DOHSA); 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1982) (Jones Act).
Washington University Open Scholarship
510 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
ules from the state statutes and grant relief. To resolve this question,
the court can refer to the Moragne policies of uniformity and
liberality.47
Paradoxically, the two policies that the Moragne Court harmonized
so effectively when creating the right of recovery appear to work at
cross purposes when a court attempts to determine the beneficiaries and
the amount of damages due under the Moragne cause of action.4 8
When courts opt for a state beneficiary schedule or for state-derived
elements of damages, a desire to provide the most liberal scope of re-
covery conflicts with and overrides the policy of uniformity.49 In con-
trast, those lower courts looking to the more restrictive DOHSA or
Jones Act schedules invariably cite the need for uniformity in maritime
law as the primary reason for following a federal statute.50 The subse-
quent conflict between the two policies that coincided in Moragne re-
quires further analysis to enable a reconciliation of these policies.
II. THE POLICY OF UNIFORMITY
Two types of uniformity are relevant to the choice of a schedule of
beneficiaries. The courts, however, are not always careful to distin-
guish between them.5 ' The first type of uniformity is a constitutional
requirement; the second is an optional goal.
The Constitution includes maritime disputes among those cases sub-
ject to federal judicial power.5 2 Congress, in the Judiciary Act of 1789,
47. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
48. The Supreme Court has felt the need to choose one policy over the other in several post-
Moragne decisions. In one case, the Court rejected DOHSA's restriction of recovery to pecuniary
loss, and after noting the trend among the states to permit recovery for loss of society, concluded
that a Moragne action also permitted recovery for loss of society. The Court noted that the mari-
time policy of liberality and solicitude for seamen dictated a broader scope of recovery. Sea-Land
Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 588 (1974). See infra notes 77-79 and accompanying text
(discussing Sea-Land). In another case, however, the Court indicated in dictum that DOHSA
should be the "primary guide" for courts dealing with a Moragne action to accomplish the goal of
uniformity. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 624 (1978).
49. See, e.g., Dennis v. Central Gulf S.S. Corp., 453 F.2d 137, 140 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 948 (1972); Palmer v. Ribax, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 974, 978-79 (M.D. Fla. 1976); In re Sincere
Navigation Corp., 329 F. Supp. 652, 657 (E.D. La. 1971).
50. See, e.g., Futch v. Midland Enter., Inc., 471 F.2d 1195, 1196 (5th Cir. 1973); Mungin v.
Calmar S.S. Corp., 342 F. Supp. 479,480 (D. Md. 1972); Guilbeau v. Calzada, 240 So. 2d 104, 110
(La. Ct. App. 1970).
51. E.g., Greene v. Vantage S.S. Corp., 466 F.2d 159, 165 (4th Cir. 1972).
52. See supra note 1. The original rationale for giving federal courts control over admiralty




gave federal district courts original jurisdiction over maritime actions,
"saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy,
where the common law is competent to give it."53 The Supreme Court
has interpreted the "saving-to-suitors" clause, which is still in force,54
to confer concurrent jurisdiction over admiralty cases upon state and
federal courts.55 Nevertheless, the Court also has held that the Consti-
tution requires all courts trying admiralty cases to apply uniformly the
general maritime law. 6 As a result, the courts cannot apply state law
that might counter an "essential feature" of maritime law.57
The constitutional requirement of uniformity does not affect the
schedule of beneficiaries under a Moragne cause of action. Constitu-
tional uniformity operates only when state law differs from an already
existent feature of maritime law. Because general maritime law lacks a
specific beneficiary schedule for wrongful death claims,58 no "existent
feature" in the federal law could conflict with state beneficiary sched-
ules. Courts refer to state law, moreover, only as a persuasive source.
The law that a court declares pursuant to Moragne, regardless of its
origins, becomes part of the general maritime law. 9
Although the constitutional requirement of uniformity does not
mandate the selection of one beneficiary schedule, uniformity in law
serves other desirable policy goals, such as predictability and simplic-
ity. The lower courts, however, have divided over the need for uni-
formity when determining the details of a Moragne cause of action.
One line of cases holds that a Moragne action does not require uni-
formity in beneficiary schedules. Under this view, "uniformity is re-
quired only when the essential features of an exclusive federal
the laws of nations, and so commonly affect the rights of foreigners, that they fall within the
considerations which are relative to the public peace." THE FEDERALIST, No. 80, at 405 (A. Ham-
ilton) (Bantam ed. 1982).
53. Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372, 383 (1918) (quoting the Judiciary Act of
1789, 1 Stat. 76-77 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1982))).
54. Congress has altered the language slightly. The clause now reads, "saving to suitors in all
cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled." 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1982).
55. SeeLeon v. Gaceran, 78 U.S. ( 1I Wall.) 185, 188-92 (1871); Taylor v. Carryl, 61 U.S. (20
How.) 583, 598-99 (1858).
56. See Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372, 383-84 (1918); Southern Pac. Co. v.
Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917).
57. Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383, 392 (1941).
58. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
59. Greene v. Vantage S.S. Corp., 466 F.2d 159, 165 (4th Cir. 1972).
60. W. GRAvEs, UNIFORM STATE ACTION 3 (1934); Commentary, Uniformity of the Commer-
cial Code, 8 B.C. INDUS. AND COMM. L. REv. 568, 592 (1967).
Number 3]
Washington University Open Scholarship
512 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 62:503
jurisdiction are involved." 6' These courts have found that the existence
of a right of recovery is the only "essential feature" of the federal inter-
est in maritime wrongful death cases.62 Uniformity then becomes irrel-
evant to the resolution of "non-essential" features such as the schedule
of beneficiaries.63 The "essential feature" approach thus is tantamount
to a claim that, beyond the constitutional requirement, 64 no policy rea-
sons for uniformity exist. Courts following this analysis also place
overriding emphasis on liberality and look to state wrongful death stat-
utes for beneficiary schedules.65
Courts applying a uniformity requirement to the determination of
the details of a Moragne cause of action rarely provide an elaborate
rationale.6 6 In most cases the policy stands as its own justification.67
State courts in particular have relied on this talismanic use of uniform-
ity.6  Nevertheless, policy arguments implicit in these cases support the
imposition of a uniform schedule of beneficiaries.
A single beneficiary schedule prevents problems in the selection of
applicable state law.69 Although a federal court sitting in admiralty
61. Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383, 392 (1941).
62. See, e.g., Dennis v. Central Gulf S.S. Corp., 453 F.2d 137, 140 (5th Cir.), "ert. denied, 409
U.S. 948 (1972).
63. Id
64. See supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
65. See supra note 49.
66. See cases cited supra note 50.
67. Id
68. See, e.g., Smith v. Allstate Yacht Rentals, Ltd., 293 A.2d 805 (Del. Super. Ct. 1972);
Strickland v. Nutt, 264 So. 2d 317 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 262 La. 1124, 266 So. 2d 432 (La.
1972); Guilbeau v. Calzada, 240 So. 2d 104 (La. Ct. App. 1970).
69. Levinson v. Deupree, 345 U.S. 648, 651 (1953). Lower courts approach the selection of
one of several states' laws in two distinct fashions. In re Canal Barge Co., 323 F. Supp. 805 (N.D.
Miss. 1971), a2f'din part andrev'dinpart, 480 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1972), amended, 513 F.2d 911 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 840 (1975), which addressed the scope of damages recoverable in a
Moragne action, illustrates the first approach. CanalBarge involved a fatal accident that occurred
on the Mississippi River along the Missouri-Illinois boundary. The decedent, an Arkansas resi-
dent, worked for an employer who was incorporated in Louisiana. The trial court convened in
Mississippi. After noting that the wrongful death statutes of each of these states provided various
elements of recovery for various classes of beneficiaries, the court decided that reliance on
DOHSA offered the simplest solution and awarded damages accordingly.
Spiller v. Thomas H. Lowe, Jr. & Assocs., Inc., 466 F.2d 903 (8th Cir. 1972) provides an exam-
ple of the contrary approach. The decedent, domiciled in Texas, died in an accident that occurred
on navigable waters in Arkansas. In the ensuing Moragne action, parents and step-children of the
decedent argued that Texas law should determine the appropriate beneficiaries. The court re-
jected this in favor of looking both to DOHSA and Arkansas law. The court then chose Arkansas
law, primarily because of the liberality of recovery permitted by the state law.
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does not need to rely on conflict of laws doctrines to ascertain applica-
ble state law, it still must articulate a standard of choice. 0 Reliance
solely on the forums' beneficiary schedules induces forum shopping.7 '
A uniform beneficiary schedule obviates the benefits of forum
shopping.
The use of a uniform schedule of beneficiaries would also provide a
measure of predictability for the parties and the courts. The applica-
tion of a uniform schedule prevents the uncertainty that arises when a
court must decide whether a given state wrongful death statute is a
suitable analogue for the maritime action.72
III. THE POLICY OF LIBERALITY
The liberality policy traditionally has been a primary consideration
of courts seeking to determine the scope of remedies under maritime
law. Justice Chase provided a classic formulation of admiralty's
perference for liberality in remedies in 1865: "[I]t better becomes the
humane and liberal character of proceedings in admiralty to give than
to withhold the remedy, when not required to withhold it by estab-
lished and inflexible rules."73 This liberality reflects the "special solici-
tude" that maritime law historically has held for the welfare of those
who work or travel upon navigable waters.74
A court making a determination of beneficiaries under a Moragne
action should begin its analysis of the scope of liberality by considering
the nature of damages allowed in maritime wrongful death claims.
Post-Moragne courts unanimously have held that beneficiaries can re-
cover for pecuniary loss.75 Allowing pecuniary damages in Moragne
actions is consonant with the trend toward applying the elements of
federal wrongful death statutes as a minimum level of recovery.76
70. 466 F.2d at 908 n.6. Federal courts sitting in admiralty do not sit as diversity courts. Id.
(citing Levinson v. Deupree, 345 U.S. 648, 651 (1953)).
71. InreCanal Barge Co., 323 F. Supp. 805, 821 (N.D. Miss. 1971), afl'd in part and rev'd in
part, 480 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1973), amended, 513 F.2d 911 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 840
(1975).
72. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
73. The Sea Gull, 21 F. Cas. 909, 910 (C.C.D. Md. 1865) (No. 12,578).
74. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 387 (1970).
75. See Annot., 18 A.L.R. FED. 184, 197-207 (1974) (DOHSA expressly provides for the re-
covery of pecuniary loss).
76. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
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In 1974, in Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet," the Supreme Court
held that the remedy for a maritime wrongful death action encom-
passed nonpecuniary losses such as loss of society.78 Recovery under
the maritime action for wrongful death thus comprises two distinct
types of harm: pecuniary loss and loss of society. Relief for pecuniary
loss compensates beneficiaries for the loss of their financial dependency
upon the decedent. Relief for loss of society compensates for the injury
to the familial bonds between the decedent and individual
beneficiaries.79
These two components of damages suggest that Moragne schedules
of beneficiaries should include both those who are so closely related to
the decedent to have suffered the loss of society that the Gaudel Court
wished to compensate,80 as well as those relatives who were financially
dependent upon the decedent. Courts proposing a schedule of benefi-
ciaries, therefore, must determine which relatives, regardless of depen-
dency, are so closely related to the decedent that they deserve to
recover damages. The Supreme Court's approach to determining dam-
ages in Gaudet suggests that courts would employ a sound method for
allocating damages by supplementing federal statutory schedules with
additional nondependent beneficiaries whom the majority of states in-
clude in their wrongful death statutes."' Consideration of the types of
damages allowed and of the views of Congress and a majority of states
77. 414 U.S. 573 (1974).
78. Id at 587-90. The Court defined "society" as a "broad range of mutual benefits each
family member receives from the others' continued existence, including love, affection, care, atten-
tion, companionship, comfort, and protection." Id at 585. The Court was careful to distinguish
loss of society, which is the loss of positive benefits that would have continued but for the fatality,
from mental anguish, which is an emotional response to the death. Id at 585 n.17. DOHSA does
not allow recovery for loss of society. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 622 (1978).
79. Recent Decisions, Damages-4ward Allowedfor Emotional Distress of Surviving Spouses
and Children, or Parents, Under General Maritime Law, 5 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 245, 249
(1971).
80. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
81. The Gaudet Court, drawing from the remedies afforded by the majority of state statutes,
held that the general maritime action for wrongful death included recovery for loss of society.
Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 587-88 (1974). Because those lower courts con-
cerned with beneficiary schedules have treated the federal statutory schedules as foundations, see
supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text, reference to the schedules of the majority of states
becomes necessary only to supplement federal schedules. For a recent decision relying on the
Gaudet Court's majority-of-states approach, see Glod v. American President Lines, Ltd., 547 F.




can provide the courts with a principled means to select a uniform ben-
eficiary schedule consistent with the policy of liberality.
IV. A PROPOSED APPROACH TO THE DETERMINATION OF A
SCHEDULE OF BENEFICIARIES
The policies of uniformity and liberality provide a foundation for
arriving at an appropriate beneficiary schedule for an admiralty wrong-
ful death action. Because uniformity as a constitutional requirement is
inapplicable to determining beneficiaries, 82 it is a governing concern
only insofar as it advances other policies. A uniform schedule of bene-
ficiaries would provide a measure of predictability and would avoid the
problem of choosing between numerous state statutes.8 3 To achieve
uniformity, courts should avoid using individual state wrongful death
statutes as a source of beneficiary schedules.8 4 Instead, as a working
principle, courts should adopt the DOHSA beneficiary schedule 5 sup-
plemented by additional beneficiaries recognized by a majority of state
schedules.
The DOHSA schedule is the most liberal in the federal wrongful
death statutes. The DOHSA schedule's provisions for collective recov-
ery by all persons within the schedule86 afford a more liberal recovery
than is available under the Jones Act's exclusionary approach, which
limits recovery to only one category of its schedule.87 In addition, al-
though the DOHSA beneficiary schedule 8 does not initially appear to
conform to the types of damages available under the general maritime
82. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 60 & 69-72 and accompanying text.
84. Lower courts have read the language of Moragne to permit reliance either on the trend
reflected by the majority of states or on details of individual state statutes. Compare Spiller v.
Thomas M. Lowe, Jr. & Assocs., Inc., 466 F.2d 903 (8th Cir. 1972) (court considered laws of Texas
and Arkansas to determine beneficiaries) with In re Sincere Navigation Corp., 329 F. Supp. 652
(E.D. La. 1971) (court looked to the trend among states to grant recovery for emotional distress).
Although the Supreme Court has not precluded either approach, in Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v.
Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573 (1974), the Court looked to the trend exhibited by the majority of state
statutes and awarded damages for loss of society under a Moragne action.
85. Courts generally have rejected the beneficiary schedule of the Jones Act, with its hierar-
chy of exclusive categories of beneficiaries. See supra note 45. Because the DOHSA schedule is
less restrictive and therefore more liberal in its scope than the Jones Act schedule, DOHSA should
provide the minimum schedule of beneficiaries.
86. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
87. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
88. For the details of the DOHSA schedule and the court's preference for the DOHSA sched-
ule over the schedules of other federal statutes, see supra notes 38-42 & 45 and accompanying text.
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law,89 the two-tiered structure of the DOHSA schedule9" affords a uni-
form schedule consistent with a principled liberal recovery policy.
First, the DOHSA schedule does not preclude recovery for pecuniary
loss. The residual clause expressly requires a showing of dependency.9"
Furthermore, while the other DOHSA category of beneficiaries 92 lacks
an express dependency requirement, an award for pecuniary loss com-
pensates a beneficiary only to the extent of loss actually suffered.
Second, the structure of the DOHSA schedule is consistent with
awarding damages for loss of society.9 3 The first tier of the DOHSA
beneficiary schedule, made up of relatives who need not show depen-
dency,94 indicates those persons likely to have suffered the loss of soci-
ety that the general maritime law wishes to compensate.95 The
dependency requirement for all other relatives96 functions as a reason-
able means to mark the outer boundary of a liberal recovery policy.
Dependency in this instance becomes a substitute for the closeness of
the kinship tie. A distant relative who can show dependency probably
had sufficiently close ties to the decedent to have suffered compensable
loss of society.
At the present time, no clear majority of states recognizes nondepen-
dent beneficiaries beyond those included within the current DOHSA
schedule.97 The state wrongful death statutes that include nondepen-
dent relatives such as brothers and sisters among the schedule of bene-
ficiaries9" constitute a distinct minority.99 Many other states allow
recovery by siblings or other relatives either expressly or through a
89. See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
90. Under DOHSA, one set of beneficiaries includes the decedent's immediate family mem-
bers and dependents. DOHSA's second tier is a residual category of dependent relatives. For
further discussion, see supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
91. Id
92. Id
93. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
94. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
96. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
97. For the text of state wrongful death statutes and a discussion of the various classes of
beneficiaries, see S. SPEISER, supra note 2, ch. 10 & app. A.
98. A list of those states expressly including brothers and sisters in beneficiary schedules
appears in S. SPEISER, supra note 2, at 155 n.144.
99. Only five states-Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Virginia and Wisconsin-appear to





residual "next of kin" or "heirs" class of beneficiaries.l" ° These juris-
dictions, however, frequently either require a showing of dependency
or limit recovery to pecuniary loss, precluding relief for loss of soci-
ety.10 Because these state schedules do not expand significantly upon
the collection of beneficiaries arising from the "dependent relative"
clause of the DOHSA schedule, 0 2 courts should prefer the DOHSA
schedule when considering general maritime wrongful death actions.
The DOHSA schedule, however, is only a persuasive analogue and
does not bind the courts.'0 3 Should either Congress or a majority of
state jurisdictions decide to allow additional nondependent relatives to
recover for wrongful deaths, courts should exercise their option to sup-
plement the DOHSA schedule.
V. CONCLUSION
In creating a right of recovery for wrongful death under general mar-
itime law, the Moragne Court relied upon the policies of uniformity
and liberality. Uncritical application of these policies by lower courts
elaborating the Moragne cause of action resulted in the use of conflict-
ing schedules of beneficiaries. A careful consideration of the interac-
tion of the policies of uniformity and liberality, however, supports the
determination of a single schedule of beneficiaries that achieves both
uniformity and liberality: the DOHSA schedule of beneficiaries, sub-
ject to revision in accordance with any future trends among congres-
sional- or state-created wrongful death beneficiary schedules.
Robert G. Hertel, Jr.
100. Annot., 31 A.L.R. 3d 379, 387-89, 397-99.
101. Id at 409-30; S. SPEISER, supra note 2, at 153-62. In addition, many of the statutes are
hierarchical like the Jones Act, see supra note 41 and accompanying text, allowing recovery by
"next of kin" only if no other closer relative such as spouse or child is living. Annot., 31 A.L.R. 3d
379, 390; S. SPEISER, supra note 2, at app. A.
102. For a detailed discussion of DOHSA beneficiaries, see Annot., 15 A.L.R. Fed. 834.
103. See supra notes 29-42 and accompanying text.
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